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| author | presse <presse@ccc.de> | 2009-04-18 19:12:41 +0000 |
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| committer | presse <presse@ccc.de> | 2020-05-23 13:38:28 +0000 |
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| 1 | title: Election-appeals and by-elections expected in Hesse state elections due to severe problems with voting computers | ||
| 2 | date: 2008-01-27 00:00:00 | ||
| 3 | updated: 2009-04-18 19:12:41 | ||
| 4 | author: presse | ||
| 5 | tags: update, pressemitteilung | ||
| 6 | |||
| 7 | Severe problems and irregularities occurred during Sunday's election for the state government in the German state of Hesse, where NEDAP voting computers were operated. | ||
| 8 | |||
| 9 | <!-- TEASER_END --> | ||
| 10 | |||
| 11 | In addition to massive obstructions of the election observers in several | ||
| 12 | communities, a number of incidents have clearly disproved the claims of | ||
| 13 | Hesse's ministry of the interior about the security and reliability of | ||
| 14 | the voting computers. | ||
| 15 | |||
| 16 | In at least one community the voting computers were stored in the | ||
| 17 | private homes of political party members over night. This is an | ||
| 18 | “established practice”, members of the regulating authority confirmed | ||
| 19 | towards the election observers. All nine voting computers had been | ||
| 20 | stored privately in this community. | ||
| 21 | |||
| 22 | “The storing of voting computers over night at the homes of local | ||
| 23 | politicians is the nightmare scenario for insider manipulation, even | ||
| 24 | according to the logic of the Hesse ministry of the interior. This is | ||
| 25 | something even we couldn't have imagined”, said Dirk Engling speaking | ||
| 26 | for Chaos Computer Club (CCC). | ||
| 27 | |||
| 28 | Election observers of the CCC were left alone for a long time in two | ||
| 29 | polling stations, before the voting executive arrived. Manipulation of | ||
| 30 | the election could have been easily accomplished by anyone left alone | ||
| 31 | with the voting computers. | ||
| 32 | |||
| 33 | In at least one polling station the NEDAP technology failed; a voting | ||
| 34 | computer in Viernheim showed an error message shortly after the startup | ||
| 35 | a few minutes before 8 o'clock. A normal vote was therefore impossible. | ||
| 36 | It took over an hour until a replacement computer arrived at the polling | ||
| 37 | station. During this time many voters were not able to vote and | ||
| 38 | effectively disenfranchised. | ||
| 39 | |||
| 40 | In Obertshausen interested citizens were refused admittance to the | ||
| 41 | polling station by an employee of the regulating authority and election | ||
| 42 | observers were even threatened with arrest. | ||
| 43 | |||
| 44 | “The election supervisor in Obertshausen obviously hasn't heard anything | ||
| 45 | of things such as openness and the legally warranted publicity of an | ||
| 46 | election”, CCC speaker Dirk Engling commented. Some election supervisors | ||
| 47 | actively tried to prevent an observation of the election in its | ||
| 48 | operation. | ||
| 49 | |||
| 50 | Observations from over 50 interested citizens showed that a large number | ||
| 51 | of older voters had problems casting their ballot on the computers, | ||
| 52 | contrary to the claims in the run-up to the election. Many were so | ||
| 53 | overwhelmed, that election helpers had to assist them with the casting | ||
| 54 | of their ballot. | ||
| 55 | |||
| 56 | The CCC also visited the people in charge of voting in the hessian | ||
| 57 | communities which had decided against using voting computers after a | ||
| 58 | testing phase. CCC activists brought biscuits to the election volunteers | ||
| 59 | in the polling stations during the counting. In the process they got | ||
| 60 | interesting insights into the reasons for the rejection of the NEDAP | ||
| 61 | voting computers. | ||
| 62 | |||
| 63 | In previous elections, the town of Weiterstadt has used voting | ||
| 64 | computers. “We were among the first who introduced voting computers. But | ||
| 65 | after the first election we experienced that the effort in preparing the | ||
| 66 | election was too large”, Mr. Gerald Eberlein, voting supervisor of | ||
| 67 | Weiterstadt, said. “I just had the feeling it was insecure”, he said | ||
| 68 | justifying the move away from the disputed computers. | ||
| 69 | |||
| 70 | In Erzhausen the ballots were also casted on paper in the traditional | ||
| 71 | manner. “We had rented the computers due to the counting and | ||
| 72 | vote-splitting during our local elections, but the promised saving of | ||
| 73 | time didn't happen, it just got more expensive. That's why we changed | ||
| 74 | back to paper”, Dieter Karl, Mayor of Erzhausen, told the CCC. The | ||
| 75 | advantages promised by the commercial supplier of NEDAP voting computers | ||
| 76 | simply did not materialise. | ||
| 77 | |||
| 78 | The discussion about the practical issues around voting computers shows | ||
| 79 | that they not save labor, but also mean more costs and time for the | ||
| 80 | communities, allow unnoticed manipulation of the result and cause major | ||
| 81 | problems for senior citizens potentially disenfranchising a segment of | ||
| 82 | the population. | ||
| 83 | |||
| 84 | Many violations of procedures were noticed by the election observers, | ||
| 85 | and the reliability problems of the NEDAP systems make it clear once | ||
| 86 | more, that the basic problems of voting computers: the inability to | ||
| 87 | verify the correct operation and transparency of the election. Neither | ||
| 88 | voters nor election helpers were able to validate the correctness of the | ||
| 89 | ballot-casting and counting. A subsequent recounting is therefore simply | ||
| 90 | not possible. | ||
| 91 | |||
| 92 | “The observation of the election in Hesse shows that the time has | ||
| 93 | definitely come to withdraw the voting computers also in Germany”, said | ||
| 94 | Dirk Engling. “Especially in the light of the tight outcome of the | ||
| 95 | election in Hesse the unacceptable risks of computer mediated voting | ||
| 96 | become very clear.” | ||
| 97 | |||
| 98 | The CCC would like to thank all election observers for their commitment | ||
| 99 | to upholding the democratic process! | ||
